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When individuals have private information about their own luck and
income, the sharing of idiosyncratic risks is hampered by moral hazard.
This friction also affects the optimal sharing of aggregate risks. Optimal
allocations restrict the exposure of low wealth agents’ consumption to
business cycle risk. This encourages truth-telling by high wealth agents
who have a high tolerance for aggregate risk, thereby increasing the
extent to which idiosyncratic risks can be shared. Implementation of
these optimal allocations requires restrictions in the trade of securities
contingent on aggregate outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumption inequality reduces during recessions, as the consumption of the high
income households falls sharply and quickly relative to other households (Giorgi
and Gambetti, 2017). This pattern is driven partly by the business cycle dynam-
ics of labor market income across sectors (Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2009),
by government income insurance policy (Perri and Steinberg, 2012), and market
allocations of risky assets (Meyer and Sullivan, 2013). This paper, taking market
income as following an exogenous process within a two-period endowment econ-
omy, provides a minimal working example of the interaction between income insur-
ance and competitive aggregate risk sharing in an economy where market income
is observed only by the recipient.
The presence of idiosyncratic risk is shown to affect the optimal sharing of ag-
gregate risk, reducing consumption inequality in downturns relative to the com-
petitive allocation of aggregate risk. The presence of aggregate risk also helps
constrained efficient mechanisms identify individual agents’ idiosyncratic risk out-
comes, increasing the extent to which idiosyncratic risks can be shared. This is the
key result of the paper and is presented as Proposition 2.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows: high wealth agents are more
tolerant of aggregate risk than low wealth agents.1 Optimal mechanisms prevent
low wealth individuals from accepting as much aggregate risk as they would prefer
to accept in unrestricted trade. These optimal mechanisms deter high wealth agents
from misrepresenting as low wealth agents, relaxing the incentive compatibility
constraint. Consequently, optimal allocations permit some sharing of idiosyncratic
risks even when these idiosyncratic risks are subject to private information.
The environment studied here is a two-period endowment economy, similar to
those studied by Green and Oh (1991) and Kiyotaki (2010). The model can also be
thought of as a two-period version of the model of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001).
1This step requires the assumption of Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA). Under
DARA preferences, any increase in wealth will increase an agent’s desired holdings of risky as-
sets.
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Idiosyncratic risk is realised in the first period, while aggregate risk is realised in the
second period. High endowment agents who report low income in the first period
can use a hidden storage technology to delay consumption to the second period.
Optimal mechanisms can identify misreporting high wealth agents by their demand
for exposure to aggregate risk. In practise, the implementation of the optimal mech-
anisms described by Proposition 2 might include high effective marginal tax rates
on high-risk savings products held by recipients of social insurance transfers. Alter-
natively, optimal allocations could potentially be implemented via the bundling of
savings products by banks to restrict access to high-risk savings portfolios to clients
with high declared net wealth.
This paper is closely related to Green and Oh (1991), who study an environ-
ment where individuals’ storage is assumed to be publicly observable and optimal
mechanisms can identify misreporting high wealth agents from their high demand
for storage. Green and Oh (1991) show that optimal mechanisms require devia-
tions in intertemporal marginal rates of substitution across high and low wealth
agents, a result that mirrors our finding of deviations in across-state marginal rates
of substitution across high and low wealth agents. In Green and Oh (1991), there is
no aggregate risk. Phelan (1994) studies a dynamic environment with overlapping
generations consumers, aggregate risk and incentive constraints relating to idiosyn-
cratic risks. Phelan (1994) shows that the distribution of consumption depends on
the history of aggregate risks. Landais et al. (2013), Mitman and Rabinovich (2015)
and Williams and Li (2015) consider the problem of providing optimal unemploy-
ment insurance over the aggregate with a focus on the efficiency costs of cyclical
fluctuations in labour market tightness.
The desire to make ex post interventions to the distribution of aggregate losses
(bailouts) or to make interventions restricting the ex ante allocation of aggregate
risk (macroprudential policy, broadly speaking) stems from concerns about the ef-
ficiency and/or fairness of market allocations of aggregate risk. This paper shows
how sequential trade in aggregate risk securities can conflict with constrained effi-
cient mechanisms of managing idiosyncratic risk. This result provides motivation
2
for intervention in the market allocation of aggregate risk.
In describing a theory of bailouts and/or macroprudential policy, this paper is
related to a growing literature describing the interactions between allocations of
aggregate risk and aggregate volatility. To date, studies have focused on the inter-
action between optimal aggregate risk sharing and balance sheet externalities, or
the interaction between aggregate risk sharing and aggregate demand externalities.
Duncan and Nolan (2015) show in a generalised financial macroeconomics frame-
work based on Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) that when entrepreneurs or firm insiders are risk averse and firms’ idiosyn-
cratic risk cannot be passed on to outside investors, there is a conflict between the
competitive allocation of aggregate risk and the constrained efficient allocations.
Competitive allocations leave firms’ balance sheets too exposed to aggregate risk,
resulting in excessive volatility in leverage and resulting factor market wedges of in-
efficiency.2 Farhi and Werning (2013) study competitive equilibrium allocations of
aggregate risk in an environment with New-Keynesian pricing rigidities. Competi-
tive equilibrium allocations equate across-state consumption marginal rates of sub-
stitution across agents. Constrained efficient allocations depart from competitive
allocations by favouring transfers toward agents who have a high demand for those
goods whose prices exhibit high markups, reducing the welfare costs of wedges of
inefficiency deriving from the price-setting friction.
Comparing the predictions of the model with the stylised facts of the behaviour
of consumption inequality over the aggregate requires strict assumptions about pref-
erences. During the Great Recession of 2007-09, P90-P10 ratio measures of in-
equality in consumption in the United States are documented to have fallen across a
range of consumption measures (Fisher, Johnson, and Smeeding 2013; Meyer and
Sullivan 2013; Perri and Steinberg 2012). This follows increases in consumption
inequality prior to the Great Recession. Under the assumption of Constant Rela-
2Duncan and Nolan (2015) can be thought of as a generalisation of the analyses of Carlstrom,
Fuerst, and Paustian (2014), Krishnamurthy (2003) and Nikolov (2014) who consider specific fi-
nancial macroeconomics models in which there is little or no conflict between the competitive and
socially optimal allocations of aggregate risk.
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tive Risk Aversion (CRRA) across agents, these trends in consumption inequality
deviate from full consumption insurance—there may be gains from trade available
to both high and low wealth agents if low wealth agents were to absorb a greater
share of consumption risk over the aggregate. This paper suggests that this type
of deviation from full consumption risk insurance over the aggregate could be ef-
ficient, allowing more insurance of individual specific or firm specific risks than
could be achieved if aggregate consumption risk were shared according to equation
of variations in marginal utilities over the aggregate.
1 THE MODEL
A unit measure of ex ante identical agents live for two periods. Agents enjoy con-
sumption with c according to utility function U(c), where U is in the Decreasing
Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) class of preferences (U ′,−U ′′ > 0, A′(c) < 0,
where A(c) = −U ′′(c)/U ′(c) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion).
The DARA class of preferences includes as a subset the class of utility functions
exhibiting Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA), where relative risk aversion is
defined as cA(c).
Consider an agent solving a portfolio choice problem with one risky and one
safe asset. DARA preferences ensure that the agent’s optimal holding of the risky
asset increases in absolute terms as the agent’s wealth increases. When aggregate
risk is introduced in Section 4, constrained efficient mechanisms use these vari-
ations demand for exposure to aggregate risk to help identify misreporting high
wealth agents.
Agents’ discount second period instantaneous utility by factor β. In the first
period, individual agents receive endowment yl with probability pil and yh with
probability pih, where yl < yh and pil + pih = 1. In period 2, all agents receive
common endowment z, where yl < z < pilyl + pihyh. That is, the second period
endowment received by all agents is less than the expected first period endowment,
but greater than the first period endowment received by low income agents. This
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assumption ensures positive gross savings. There exists a durable good, which
converts the period 1 consumption good into the period 2 consumption good. First
period savings x returnRx units of the period 2 consumption good, whereR = 1/β.
Without loss of generality, the consumption enjoyed by an individual agent earning
yl in period 1 is denoted c1l.
Within the class of problems we consider in this paper, the revelation principle
holds. We can consider the constrained efficient allocations of any given problem
to be attainable by a direct mechanism implemented by a benevolent social planner.
The social planner aims to maximise the ex ante expected discounted utility of
agents. There is no conflict between agents at time zero, before the idiosyncratic
risk y is drawn. The planner’s objective function is
max
c,x
pilU(c1l) + pihU(c1h) + β[pilU(c2l) + pihU(c2h)] (1.1)
The planner’s first and second period resource constraints are as follows and we
attach Lagrange multipliers λ1, λ2 to them respectively:
pilyl + pihyh ≥ pilc1l + pihc1h + x (1.2)
z +Rx ≥ pilc2l + pihc2h (1.3)
The first period budget constraint (1.2) states that the sum of first period consump-
tion across agents and savings (RHS) must be less than or equal to the total first
period endowment income across agents (LHS). The second period budget con-
straint (1.3) states that total second period consumption (RHS) cannot exceed the
sum of second period income and the gross return to first period savings (LHS). It is
clear that in constrained efficiency requires that both resource constraints (1.2,1.3)
are binding. If either constraint were not binding, it must be the case that there is an
individual agent whose consumption could be increased without violation of any of
the constraints faced by the social planner.
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2 PERFECT INFORMATION
With perfect information, the planner solves (1.1) subject to the resource constraints
(1.2,1.3). The first order necessary conditions can be written as follows
c1i : λ1 = U
′(c1l) = U
′(c1h)
c2i : λ2/β = U
′(c2l) = U
′(c2h)
x : λ1 = Rλ2
From the first order necessary conditions, we can see that under the planner’s so-
lution, agents enjoy full consumption insurance, with consumption equated across
high and low income agents. Agents also enjoy perfect consumption smoothing,
with
c1l = c1h = c2l = c2h =
1
1 + β
[pilyl + pihyh + βz] .
This solution characterises the first-best efficient allocations in our model. The
incomes of high endowment and low endowment agents are shared, as though all
agents hold equity shares in each others’ incomes. The storage technology is used
to smooth the consumption of all households over the two periods.
3 PRIVATE INFORMATION
Now, consider the same model, but where the planner cannot directly observe which
agents have received the high endowments, and which have received the low endow-
ments. It is also assumed that individuals savings held in the durable good cannot
be observed by the planner.3 Agents now have the option of lying about their en-
dowment to the planner, and saving any excess income they do not wish to consume
3The assumption that storage is hidden is important. When storage is observable, misreporting
high type agents are unable to smooth consumption. This inability to smooth consumption can be
manipulated by the social planner to provide some consumption insurance across high and low type
agents that is not possible when storage is hidden. See Green and Oh (1991) and Kiyotaki (2010)
for details.
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in the first period, earning return R on all savings. The revelation principle holds
in our environment, and optimal allocations can be implemented by the planner,
whose problem is now subject to the following truth-telling constraint to which we
attach the Lagrange multiplier µ:
U(c1h) + βU(c2h) = V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l). (3.1)
The value function V represents the expected discounted utility obtainable by an
agent who receives a high endowment and fraudulently declares a low endowment.
In the first period, they recieve a transfer from the planner equal to c1l − yl, which
is added to their true endowment of yh. In the second period they receive transfer
c2l − z, which they can add to their endowment z and the gross return from any
private savings in the durable good.
It is clear to see that any similar constraint to ensure truth-telling from agents
receiving a low endowment would not be binding under any optimal consumption
plan. The primary objective of the planner is to provide insurance to agents receiv-
ing low endowments, and it is always in the interest of those agents to declare their
endowments truthfully.
We now solve for the value attainable by a recipient of a high endowment who
misreports their endowment before returning to the planner’s problem.
3.1 THE VALUE OF MISREPORTING
Consider a recipient of a high endowment who reports a low endowment. We denote
their consumption allocations in periods 1 and 2 by cˆ1 and cˆ2 respectively. As
storage is hidden, this agent can use the storage technology to smooth consumption
across the two periods. The misreporting agent solves the following problem




subject to the resource constraints
c1l + yh − yl ≥ cˆ1 + xˆ,
Rxˆ+ c2l ≥ cˆ2.
The left hand side of the first resource constraint adds the difference between high
and low endowments (the hidden part of the endowment) to the consumption al-
location of a truth-telling low endowment agent. The left hand side of the second
resource constraint adds the gross return of any hidden savings to the consumption
allocation of a truth-telling low endowment agent. The solution to this problem is
cˆ1 = cˆ2 =
1
1 + β
[c1l + yh − yl + βc2l]




[c1l + yh − yl + βc2l]
)
(3.2)
3.2 THE PLANNER’S SOLUTION
The planner maximises (1.1) subject to the resource constraints (1.2,1.3) and the
truth-telling constraint (3.1) with the solution (3.2). The first order necessary con-
ditions are





[c1l + yh − yl + βc2l]
)





[c1l + yh − yl + βc2l]
)
c1h : pihλ1 = pihU
′(c1h) + µU
′(c1h)
c2h : pihλ2 = pihβU
′(c2h) + µβU
′(c2h)
x : λ1 = Rλ2
8
It is straightforward to verify that the solution to this problem is
c1l = c2l =
1
1 + β
[yl + βz], c1h = c2h =
1
1 + β
[yh + βz]. (3.3)
3.3 COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH NON-CONTINGENT DEBT
The solution described by Equation 3.3 is consistent with consumption smoothing
over time by individual agents (βU ′(c2l)/U
′(c1l) = 1/R), which under our specific
restrictions on parameter values (notably β = 1/R) means that individual consump-
tion paths are constant across time (c1j = c2j). But the solution also restricts the
total present value of consumption of each agent to be equal to the present value of
their endowment paths (c1l+βc2l = yl+βz). This indicates that there is no sharing
of the idiosyncratic endowment shocks across agents. There is no redistribution of
present value wealth after endowments are realised in period 1.
Proposition 1 shows that these constrained optimal allocations described in (3.3)
can be implemented through decentralised trade in one period non-contingent loans,
where this loan market opens after endowments have been realised in period 1.
These loan markets enable agents to bring forward or delay consumption from and
to the future, which offers an improvement in welfare terms relative to autarky, but
little insurance against endowment risks.
Proposition 1. When aggregate income is constant, the constrained efficient allo-
cations under private information with hidden storage can be implemented with
decentralised trade in non-contingent one period debt contracts.
The proof of Proposition 1 is contained in Appendix A.
4 AGGREGATE RISK
Now we introduce aggregate risk through an aggregate endowment shock in period
2. The common endowment received in period 2, z, can take the values zL < zH ,
with probabilities P (zL), P (zH) respectively, where P (zL) + P (zH) = 1.
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What we’re interested in is how the aggregate risk z is shared, and whether
decentralised trade in the simple debt contracts we considered in the previous sec-
tion can still implement constrained efficient allocations. We start by describing
the planner’s problem and the planner’s first order necessary conditions before con-
sidering whether these conditions can be satisfied by decentralised sequential trade
in non-contingent or aggregate state-contingent debt securities. Then we return
to solve the planner’s problem and derive the intuition behind our result that de-
centralised trade in these simple contracts cannot implement constrained efficient
allocations.
4.1 THE PLANNER’S PROBLEM
When the economy suffers from aggregate risk, the planner’s objective function
takes expectations of individual utilities across individual agents and aggregate
states (z). The planner’s objective function can be written as follows,
max
c,x
pilU(c1l) + pihU(c1h) + β Ez [pi1U(c2l(z)) + pihU(c2h(z))] ,
subject to the budget constraints,
pilyl + pihyh ≥ pilc1l + pihc1h + x, (λ1)
Rx+ z ≥ pilc2l(z) + pihc2h(z) z ∈ {zL, zH}. (λ2(z))
The first period budget constraint is the same as in the earlier cases with no aggre-
gate risk. The second period budget constraints are contingent on the realisation of
the common shock (z).
The incentive compatibility constraints also change. Agents report their endow-
ments following realisation in period 1. Therefore, when deciding whether or not to
report truthfully, they must take expectations over the allocation policy rule (c2l(z))
and the distribution of common shocks (z). The first incentive compatibility con-
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straint is
U(c1h) + βEU(c2h(z)) ≥ V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)), (µ)
where V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)) describes the value obtainable to a an agent who
receives a high endowment in the first period but declares a low income to the
social planner.
4.1.1 KEY FEATURES OF CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
Derivations of the equations in this section are contained in Appendix B.
A useful object that we will be relying on to compare allocations is the con-
sumption marginal rate of substitution between high and low realisations of the
aggregate shock, z.
Definition 1. The across-state consumption marginal rate of substitution of indi-




For all of the allocations we consider, the across-state consumption marginal rate
of substitution will be between zero and one, with
U ′(c2i(zH))
U ′(c2i(zL))
= 1 corresponding to




< 1 corresponding to situations where the period 2 consumption of
agent i is greater upon the realisation of the boom, z = zH , than upon the realisation
of the recession, z = zL.
Misreporting agents receive the same transfer from the planner in period 2 as
truth-telling low type agents. However, bringing forward any savings from the pre-
vious period leaves them with greater expected consumption. Under the assumption
of DARA preferences, the across-state consumption marginal rate of substitution
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The planner can use this difference in consumption marginal rates of substitution to
attain greater insurance against idiosyncratic risks while retaining truth-telling: A
small perturbation in consumption allocations that reduces the absolute difference
in period two low type consumption allocations |c2l(zH)−c2l(zL)| offers a relatively
large welfare gain to truth-telling low types, at the incentive cost of a relatively small
welfare gain to misreporting agents. In incentive terms, it is best to insure ex ante
idiosyncratic risks through access to aggregate risk insurance, rather than through
expected consumption.
This result is summarised by Proposition 2. Constrained efficient allocations re-
strict the volatility of low endowment agents’ consumption in response to aggregate
risk to such an extent that these agents’ across-state consumption marginal rate of
substitution is greater than that of high endowment agents.
Proposition 2. When agents’ preferences exhibit DARA, then under the constrained
efficient allocations, the period 2 across-state consumption marginal rate of substi-







A proof of Proposition 2 is contained in Appendix B.
Allocations consistent with Proposition 2 cannot be implemented via mecha-
nisms that allow for unrestricted trade in aggregate risk insurance before the real-
isation of the common shock in period 2. The inequality described by 4.2 shows
that if these markets were to open, there would be gains from trade available from
the sale of exposure to aggregate risk from the high endowment agents to the low
endowment agents. Unfortunately, this ex post trade would increase the value at-
tainable by agents who misreported their income ex ante, and the mechanism would
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no longer be incentive compatible. Whether through a direct mechanism with tax or
regulatory restrictions on business cycle risk contracts, or through a decentralised
mechanism with voluntary restrictions on trade in aggregate risk contracts, con-
strained efficient mechanisms must somehow restrict trade in aggregate risk con-
tracts.
It is also important to note that as misreporting agents have access to the private
storage technology, their ex ante intertemporal marginal rates of substitution bind
at the rate of return offered by the storage technology, and are unaffected by small
perturbations in consumption allocations around the constrained efficient solution.
It follows that constrained efficient allocations are consistent with high and low type
agents’ ex ante intertemporal marginal rates of substitution equating to the rate of








One corollary of this result is that the constrained efficient allocations can be imple-
mented via a mechanism that allows for unrestricted side trading in non-contingent
debt contracts.
4.2 COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH NON-CONTINGENT DEBT
In period 1, upon realisaton of endowments, individual agent in receipt of endow-
ment yi can buy (+) or offer (-) unlimited quantities of non-contingent debt bi, each
unit of which returns one unit of the consumption good in the second period. The




subject to the resource constraints
yi ≥ c1i + xi +Qbi, (λ1i)
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Rxi + bi + z ≥ c2i(z). (λ2i(z))
In symmetric equilibrium, the total supply of one period bonds must be equal to
zero:
pilbl + pihbh = 0.
The first order necessary conditions are
c1i : λ1i = U
′(c1i)
c2i : λ2i = βU
′(c2i(z))
x : λ1i = REλ2i(z)
b : Qλ1i = Eλ2i(z)
The problem with the non-contingent debt contracts is that while they do pro-
vide some intertemporal insurance in the form of consumption smoothing, they
do not provide sufficient insurance against aggregate risks. Creditors (receivers of
high endowments) and debtors (low endowments) face identical absolute consump-
tion risks in the second period with respect to the aggregate risk. But debtors have
higher expected marginal utility in the second period than debtors, and any abso-
lute decrease in consumption results in a greater proportional increase in marginal
utility than that suffered by a creditor following the identical absolute change in
consumption (under DARA preferences).
Proposition 3. With aggregate risk present and DARA preferences, and with trade
in non-contingent debt contracts only, the period 2 across-state consumption marginal







The proof of Proposition 3 is contained in Appendix C.
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Corollary 1. With aggregate risk present and under DARA preferences, the com-
petitive equilibrium with sequential trade in non-contingent debt only is not con-
strained efficient.
Proof. The proof of Corollary 2 follows directly from consideration of equation
4.4, which contradicts equation 4.2.
It is this difference in how each group’s marginal utilities respond to the aggre-
gate risk that indicates that a market for aggregate risk insurance, or an allocation
mechanism replicating the missing aggregate risk insurance could yield a Pareto
welfare gain. Low endowment agents have a relatively low across-state marginal
rate of substitution compared with high endowment agents. It follows that if a mar-
ket in aggregate risk insurance were to open before the realisation of the aggregate
risk z, gains from trade would be possible from trade in this market, with low en-
dowment agents purchasing aggregate risk insurance from high endowment agents.
Now, we introduce a market for aggregate risk insurance into our competitive
environment.
4.3 THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH STATE-CONTINGENT DEBT CON-
TRACTS
We’ve shown that simple non-contingent debt contracts cannot implement con-
strained efficient allocations when our endowment economy suffers from aggregate
or aggregate risk. Ex ante, all individual agents are identical, but after the realisa-
tion of idiosyncratic risk, some agents have greater wealth and consumption than
others. These low wealth individuals are less able and willing to bear aggregate risk
than the higher wealth individuals. Since the outcome of the aggregate risk is com-
mon knowledge, the planner is able to construct a superior mechanism that does
provide low wealth agents with some insurance against the aggregate risk shock,
resulting in a Pareto welfare improvement.
In this section, we consider whether decentralised trade could achieve con-
strained efficient allocations, if individual agents were able to trade a richer set
15
of securities that allowed for payoffs that respond to the outcome of the aggregate
risk.
In period 1, upon realisaton of endowments, individual agent in receipt of en-
dowment yi can buy (+) or offer (-) unlimited quantities of state-contingent debt
bi(z
′), each unit of which returns one unit of the consumption good in the second
period if and only if the realisation of z is z = z′. Each security b(z′) trades at price
Q(z′) in period 1.




subject to the resource constraints
yi ≥ c1i + xi +Q(z)bi(z), (λ1i)
Rxi + bi(z) + z ≥ c2i(z). (λ2i(z))
In symmetric equilibrium, the total supply of bonds contingent on state z must be
equal to zero:
pilbl(z) + pihbh(z) = 0 ∀z.
The first order necessary conditions are
c1i : λ1i = U
′(c1i)
c2i : λ2i = βU
′(c2i(z))
x : λ1i = REλ2i(z)
b(z) : Q(z)λ1i = λ2i(z) ∀z
We can see straight away that the agents in our economy do in fact utilise the state-
contingent contracts. There is full consumption risk sharing with respect to the
aggregate risk, z:
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Proposition 4. With trade in both non-contingent debt and one period securities
contingent on the aggregate shock z, the period 2 across-state consumption marginal








Proof. From the agents’ first order necessary condition for borrowing b(z), we have
λ2l(zH)/λ2l(zL) = λ2h(zH)/λ2h(zL) = Q(zH)/Q(zL). From here, we can make
the substitution λ2i = βU
′(c2i(z)) to complete the proof.
Corollary 2. With aggregate risk present, the competitive equilibriumwith sequen-
tial trade in non-contingent debt and aggregate risk insurance securities is not con-
strained efficient.
Proof. The proof of Corollary 2 follows directly from consideration of equation
4.5, which contradicts equation 4.2.
When aggregate risk markets are open, and loan contracts can be written to
be contingent on the aggregate state, there is full consumption insurance. High
income and low income agents experience the same variation in marginal utilities
across aggregate states.
5 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Table 5.1 presents the results of numerical simulations of the model with con-
strained efficient allocations (Section 4.1), non-contingent debt contracts (Section
4.2) and aggregate state contingent debt contracts (Section 4.3). The idiosyncratic
risk state space has been extended from a high-low shock (y ∈ {yl, yh}) to a vector
of ten possible realisations (y ∈ {y1, y2, ..., y10}). Otherwise, the model is identical
to earlier sections.
Period 1 endowments are drawn as follows: yi = 5 + (i − 1)/9 and endow-
ments are drawn from a binomial distribution B(9, 0.5). That is, yi is drawn with
17
Table 5.1: Numerical example
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. The common period 2 endowment z is zL = 4 with
probability P (zL) = 1/2, and zH = 5 otherwise. Agents enjoy consumption ac-
cording to U(c) =
√
c. Agents discount second period expected utility according
to factor β = 0.95, and the storage technology provides gross return R = 1/β.




. Consistent with equations 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5, the across-state
consumption MRS is decreasing in initial endowments under the constrained effi-
cient allocations, increasing under non-contingent debt, and constant under state-
contingent debt. This pattern is also shown in panel (c), which plots period 2 con-
sumption allocations. Under the constrained efficient allocations, the sensitivity
of period 2 consumption to period 1 endowments is low (high) when the common
shock is low (high). In other words, the distribution of consumption across agents
widens in the boom state and tightens in the recession state.
Total period 1 savings are low when the contract space is restricted to non-
contingent debt (panels b and d). The intuition behind the increase in savings under
the constrained efficient and contingent debt allocations is that these mechanisms
enable the economy to mobilise the savings of high wealth agents. When the con-
tract space is restricted to non-contingent debt only, these high wealth agents have
little motive for precautionary savings. When aggregate risk markets are open,
higher endowment agents can use these markets to increase their exposure to ag-
gregate risk in return for higher second period consumption. At the same time, low
endowment agents can insure their aggregate risk for a small reduction in expected
consumption.
6 DISCUSSION
Under the optimal allocations studied here and characterised by Proposition 2, ag-
gregate risk allocations depart from full risk sharing in the sense that more wealthy
agents experience wilder swings in expected marginal utility over the aggregate
than low wealth agents. The problem of efficiently sharing the burden of the ag-
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gregate over the population conflicts with the problem of idiosyncratic risk sharing
either through social insurance or private risk sharing arrangements.
The optimal allocations derived in this paper could be achieved either through
long term private contracts, or through state intervention with taxation, transfers and
financial regulation instruments. The important challenge faced by either competi-
tive or social mechanisms aimed at implementing allocations consistent with opti-
mality in our environment is whether or not these mechanisms can effectively deter,
tax or eliminate side-trades in securities contingent on aggregate risk between indi-
vidual pairs of agents. These side-trades if permitted would result in the equating
of across-state marginal rates of substitution, tightening the incentive compatibility
constraint with respect to the reporting of individual specific risk outcomes.
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A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. In period 1, upon realisaton of endowments, individual agent in receipt of
endowment yi can buy (+) or offer (-) unlimited quantities of non-contingent debt bi,
each unit of which returns one unit of the consumption good in the second period.




subject to the resource constraints
yi ≥ c1i + xi +Qbi, (λ1i)
Rxi + bi + z ≥ c2i. (λ2i)
In symmetric equilibrium, the total supply of one period bonds must be equal to
zero:
pilbl + pihbh = 0.
The first order necessary conditions are
c1i : λ1i = U
′(c1i)
c2i : λ2i = βU
′(c2i)
x : λ1 = Rλ2
b : Qλ1 = λ2
The agents’ first order necessary conditions can be rearranged to show that agents’




The value of c1i that satisfies c1i = c2i and the individual budget constraints for the





which is identical to the solution 3.3.
B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. The first step in solving the planner’s problem is to consider the value at-
tainable by high endowment agents who misreport their endowment.
B.1 THE VALUE OF MISREPORTING
A recipient of a high endowment who reports a low endowment solves the following
problem
V (c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)) = max
cˆ,x
U(cˆ1) + βEU(cˆ2(z))
subject to the resource constraints
c1l + yh − yl ≥ cˆ1 + xˆ, (λˆ1)
Rxˆ+ c2l(z) ≥ cˆ2(z) ∀z, (λˆ2(z))
and the non-negative storage constraint,
xˆ ≥ 0. (νˆ)
It is clear that under any optimal consumption plan, the period 1 and period 2 re-
source constraints are binding (λˆ1, λˆ2(z) > 0). Whether or not the non-negative
storage constraint is binding will depend on the allocations c1l, c2l(z) and the hid-
den part of the agent’s endowment yh − yl.
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From the period 2 budget constraints, we can see that the difference in state-
contingent consumption allocations of the misreporting agents are equal to those
same differences for low reporting truth-telling agents. That is,
cˆ2(zH)− cˆ2(zL) = c2l(zH)− c2h(zL). (B.1)
The agent’s first order conditions are
cˆ1 : λˆ1 = U
′(cˆ1)
cˆ2(z) : λˆ2(z) = βU
′(cˆ2(z))
x : λˆ1 = REλˆ2(z) + νˆ
and the complementary slackness condition relating to savings is
xˆνˆ = 0.
We’ll see in the next section that under constrained efficient allocations, low endow-
ment agents’ intertemporal MRS will bind with respect to the gross return to the
savings technology. Consequently, misreporting agents will wish to save a strictly
positive fraction of their period 1 resources. This allows us to restrict attention to
cases where xˆ > 0, νˆ = 0. Formally, Lemma 1 describes the key results that follow:
Lemma 1. Under any allocation where low endowment agents’ ex ante intertem-







, it follows that
(a) any misreporting agent saves a strictly positive amount of their first period
wealth, xˆ > 0.
(b) Misreporting agents’ ex ante intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is
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(c) Under DARA preferences, the across state marginal rate of substitution of








Proof. (a) Assume that xˆ = 0. In accordance with the resource constraints, cˆ2(z) =













By the complementary slackness condition, νˆ > 0, which after substitution into







contradicts the previous inequality.
(b) From part (a), optimal savings are positive, xˆ > 0, νˆ = 0. After substitution







(c) From the misreporting agent’s resource constraints, we see that if xˆ is pos-
itive, cˆ2(z) > c2l(z). Combining this with Equation B.1 and the assumption of
DARA preferences completes the proof.
As we’ll see, the inequality described in Lemma 1 part (c) creates an opportunity
for the planner to implement some insurance against idiosyncratic risks. Specifi-
cally, aggregate risk insurance plans that are desirable to low wealth individuals
are undesirable to high endowment individuals, who have greater tolerance for ag-
gregate risk. Constrained efficient mechanisms can use this information to elicit
truth-telling from high endowment agents even when revelation of a high endow-
ment motivates a transfer of wealth to low endowment agents.
Solving the planner’s problem will require the use of the envelope theorem. We
denote as follows the partial derivatives of the misreporting agents’ value functions
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= βP (z)U ′(cˆ2(z)).
B.2 THE PLANNER’S FIRST ORDER NECESSARY CONDITIONS
The planner’s first order necessary conditions are described by the following:
c1l : 0 = pilU
′(c1l)− pilλ1 − µV1(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z))
c1h : 0 = pihU
′(c1h)− pihλ1 + µU ′(c1h)
x : 0 = λ1 −REλ2(z)
c2l(z) : 0 = P (z)pilβU
′(c2l(z))− P (z)pi1λ2(z)− µV2z(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z))
c2h(z) : 0 = P (z)pihβU
′(c2h(z))− P (z)pihλ2(z) + µβP (z)U ′(c2h(z))
Eliminating µ from the planner’s first order conditions with respect to the con-






Which ensures first that high endowment agents receive aggregate risk consumption







and second, when combined with the first order condition for aggregate savings
x, that the high endowment agents’ intertemporal marginal rates of substitution










Turning to the low endowment households, eliminating µ from the first order con-
ditions for their consumption allocations yields
U ′(c1l)− λ1
V1(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)) =
U ′(c2l(z))− λ2(z)
V2z(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z))/P (z) . (B.5)
From here we proceed as follows: First, we assume that equations B.2 and B.3 hold.
We then verify that the ex ante intertemporal marginal rate of substitution equates to






. If true, then by Lemma
1, equations B.2 and B.3 must hold.















Equation B.6 verifies that (B.2) and (B.3) hold by Lemma 1. Equation B.7 when
combined with (B.4) shows that low endowment agents are protected from aggre-
gate risk (z), to such an extent that their second period marginal utility is less sen-








C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proof. Consider a mechanism that replicates the consumption allocations that are
identical to those enjoyed by agents under the competitive equilibrium with non-
contingent debt. Non-contingent debt does not allow for transfers of wealth con-
tingent on the common shock z. Given this, and the fact that the first order con-
ditions of the individual agents under competitive trade with non-contingent debt
result in the gross interest rate being equated to the gross return to hidden savings
(1/Q = R), solving the value function of misreporting agents yields the following:
V1(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)) = U ′(c1h)
V2z(c1l + yh − yl, c2l(z)) = βP (z)U ′(c2h(z)).






































As non-contingent debt does not allow transfers between agents contingent on z,
the individual agents’ budget constraints specify that the absolute difference in con-
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sumption across the common shock (z) is equated across individual agents:
c2l(zH)− c2l(zL) = c2h(zH)− c2h(zL).
But, as non-contingent debt also does not allow transfers of wealth across agents,
the consumption smoothing by individual agents specified by their individual first
order necessary conditions means that
c2l(z) < c2h(z) ∀z.
Under DARA preferences, it can be shown that U ′′′(c) > 0. It follows that under
the competitive equilibrium under non-contingent debt contracts,
U ′(c2l(zH))
U ′(c2l(zL))
<
U ′(c2h(zH))
U ′(c2h(zL))
. (4.4)
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